Hormuz Crisis Deepens: One Week In, the Strait Remains Closed and New Zealand Has No Plan
Wise Response Society calls for immediate rationing as conflict duration projections lengthen and Australia begins fuel rationing
9 March 2026 - One week after US-Israeli strikes on Iran triggered the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Wise Response Society warns that the situation has deteriorated significantly since its initial alert on 3rd March - and that the New Zealand government’s silence on contingency planning is becoming increasingly dangerous.
If the New Zealand government has a plan for rationing fuel, it has not discussed it with the public. It is the position of the Wise Response Society that it must do so immediately.
In the nine days since US-Israeli strikes on Iran triggered the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the crisis has moved well beyond a shipping disruption. Force Majeure declarations are now cascading through the entire supply chain that New Zealand depends on for 100% of its refined fuel, from Gulf producers through to the South Korean and Singaporean refineries that supply our petrol, diesel, and jet fuel. When a supplier declares Force Majeure, it is legally stating that it cannot fulfil its contracts. New Zealand may have only two to three weeks of physical fuel in the country, the pipeline of future deliveries is being disrupted by Force Majeure, and the bulk of our stated 90-day reserves consist of untested paper agreements with overseas governments.
Yet the New Zealand government has offered no public assessment of fuel supply risk, no activation of the National Fuel Security Plan, and no indication that contingency planning is underway. Countries across the region, from Thailand to Myanmar to India, have already taken concrete action. New Zealand has said nothing.
Wise Response Chair Nathan Surendran says it is clear the conflict is not going to be the “four-week process” projected by President Trump.
“This puts New Zealand in a critical situation that needs planning, public awareness, and action readiness. New Zealand is at the end of a very long supply chain and is more vulnerable than most to supply shocks of this kind. All of our exporting and importing relies on timely supply of fuel, and this is about to be seriously disrupted. All of our productive sector also relies on timely fuel supply, so this too will be heavily disrupted. The government needs to be getting its rationing priorities in place now so that people and businesses can plan for themselves.”
The conflict is not ending in four weeks
When Wise Response issued its first press release on this subject last week, President Trump was projecting a “four-week process.” One week later, that timeline is looking hopelessly optimistic, and has been extended multiple times.
Analysts at Verisk Maplecroft warn that the US should “brace for potentially an extended conflict,” noting that Iran is “a huge country with a huge population” and a very extensive security apparatus. The Brookings Institution’s Suzanne Maloney has said the situation is “going to be more complicated than the White House may have hoped.” Oxford Economics initially projected one to three weeks, with a maximum of two months. US war aims have shifted repeatedly - from destroying Iran’s nuclear programme, to eliminating its ballistic missile capability, to unspecified “protection of the American public.”
Iran’s retaliatory missile rate has declined, likely reflecting elimination of targets and reduced missile defence systems interdictions leading to higher success rates per launch, but the IRGC continues to attack vessels and maintain its hold on the strait. There is no ceasefire, no negotiation, and no clear off-ramp. Iran’s security chief Ali Larijani has explicitly rejected talks with the US.
Most critically for energy markets and New Zealand’s oil supply, the damage is becoming structural. On 6 March, Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi warned that if the war continues, other Gulf energy producers may be forced to halt exports and declare Force Majeure. Qatar had already stopped gas production on 2 March and declared Force Majeure on gas contracts on 4 March. Oil fields across the Gulf have shut down as a precaution. Oil facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been struck by Iranian missiles. This is no longer a shipping logistics problem that resolves when the strait reopens - production infrastructure is being damaged and taken offline.
Iranian strikes have hit refineries in at least six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman. Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery - the kingdom’s largest - has been shut down. Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility, the biggest in the world, has been struck. Fuel storage at Oman’s port of Duqm has been hit by drones. Oil fields in Iraq and Kuwait have been forced to cut production because Gulf storage is filling up with nowhere to ship crude. As Rystad Energy’s Amir Zaman warned this weekend, restarting oilfields that have been shut in “could take days or weeks or months, depending on the types of fields, age of the field, the type of shut-in.” The idea that this crisis ends when the shooting stops is a dangerous illusion. The physical damage has already been done, and the supply disruption will outlast the conflict itself.
This point cannot be overstated: even if traffic through the Strait of Hormuz were restored tomorrow - and it will not be - the damage already inflicted on energy infrastructure across the region would take months to repair. Additionally, a significant proportion of New Zealand’s 90 day strategic reserve is ‘preferential buy options on the oil market’, and declarations of Force Majeure mean those options / obligations cannot be met, as we describe below.
New Zealand’s fuel supply chain is under direct and mounting pressure
The headline oil price - Brent crude at approximately US$93 per barrel as of Friday’s close, up over 20% in a single week - understates the severity of the situation for New Zealand. Goldman Sachs has warned that prices could exceed US$100 per barrel this week if no resolution emerges.
But the real story is in refined products and physical crude markets, which is where New Zealand’s actual exposure lies. Kpler, a leading commodity intelligence firm, reports that physical crude delivered into China is now approaching US$100 per barrel - well above the paper futures price. Singapore jet fuel prices have surged approximately 140%. If crude had moved in proportion to jet fuel, Brent would already be trading around US$175. The gap between paper and physical markets reflects a dangerous complacency: financial markets are still treating this as a temporary disruption, while the physical supply chain is already in crisis.
The Asian refineries that supply virtually all of New Zealand’s fuel are under direct pressure:
South Korea, which provides 48% of NZ’s refined fuel imports, sources approximately 70% of its crude from the Middle East, with over 95% of that volume transiting the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea’s four major refiners have formed a joint task force. Kpler has recommended that South Korean refineries make proactive run-cut decisions - that is, reduce output - due to reduced crude supply and feedstock scheduling challenges.
Singapore, which provides 33% of NZ’s refined fuel imports, has no domestic oil or gas production whatsoever. It is one of Asia’s three principal refining centres and is reporting reduced output due to disrupted Middle Eastern crude supply.
China, which holds roughly 18% of global refining capacity, ordered its largest oil refineries to halt diesel and petrol exports on 5 March. India has instructed state-owned enterprises to consider withholding clean product exports. Thailand suspended crude and petroleum exports on 1 March. Indonesia is calling force majeure on some contracts.
As the New Zealand Energy Substack reported this week: diesel is likely to tighten before petrol, because Asian refineries are optimised for the medium sour crudes from the Middle East that are no longer arriving. They cannot simply substitute other crude grades and produce the same product mix. Diesel powers New Zealand’s freight, agriculture, construction, and fishing fleets. It is the most economically critical fuel we import.
New Zealand’s fuel reserves - 28 days of petrol, 24 days of jet fuel, and just 21 days of diesel - were not designed for this scenario. The diesel reserve is not scheduled to increase to 28 days until July 2028. Industry estimates suggest the country typically holds only two to three weeks of commercial fuel stocks in storage. Contracted March cargoes are reportedly still in transit, but unless the situation resolves quickly, April supply is in serious question.
Force Majeure is cascading through NZ’s supply chain
The legal term Force Majeure, meaning an unforeseeable event that prevents a party from fulfilling a contract, has become the defining feature of this crisis. In the past week, declarations have cascaded from Gulf producers through to the Asian refiners and petrochemical manufacturers that sit directly upstream of New Zealand.
Gulf producers:
QatarEnergy (Qatar) declared Force Majeure on LNG deliveries around 3-4 March, after halting production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG export facility. Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi has warned that all remaining Gulf exporters are expected to declare Force Majeure within days if the situation continues, and has predicted oil could hit US$150 per barrel if the war continues for weeks.
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation formally declared Force Majeure on oil and refinery products around 7 March, citing Iranian threats, attacks on Kuwaiti territory, and the absence of available vessels.
New Zealand’s direct supply chain:
Yeochun NCC (South Korea) declared Force Majeure on 4 March on petrochemical supply, because naphtha feedstock is no longer available. 54% of South Korea’s naphtha supply normally transits the Strait of Hormuz.
PCS (Singapore) declared Force Majeure on 5 March on all customer shipments.
Aster Chemicals and Energy (Singapore) declared Force Majeure around 7 March on ethylene and propylene supplies.
Chandra Asri (Indonesia) declared Force Majeure on 3 March on all contracts, citing raw material disruption.
Petronet LNG (India) issued a Force Majeure notice on 3 March on its Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement.
Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals (MRPL) (India) declared Force Majeure around 5 March on all future gasoline export cargoes. MRPL has also shut its crude unit and secondary units at its 300,000 barrel-per-day refinery.
Beyond formal Force Majeure declarations, production shutdowns are spreading. Iraq is holding back production as storage fills. The UAE’s ADNOC is cutting offshore production. Saudi Arabia has shut its biggest refinery. In China, Zhejiang Petrochemical (backed by Saudi Aramco) has shut a 200,000 barrel-per-day crude distillation unit, and Fujian Refining has shut an 80,000 barrel-per-day crude unit. China ordered a halt to new refined gasoline export contracts on 5 March. Thailand has halted all fuel exports. Vietnam’s Binh Son Refining has asked the government to prioritise domestic crude supply and limit exports through Q3.
The Force Majeure declarations cascading through our supply chain threaten the pipeline of future deliveries. When suppliers like those in South Korea and Singapore declare Force Majeure, it means the contracted fuel cargoes that New Zealand is relying on to replenish Tier 1 and Tier 2 stocks may simply not arrive. Meanwhile, the oil tickets that make up the bulk of the 90-day headline figure have never been tested in a crisis of this magnitude, and there is no public information on whether New Zealand could actually draw on them while the US, UK, and Japan are themselves scrambling for supply. In a global crisis where those same countries are simultaneously under fuel supply stress, the practical value of these tickets is questionable at best.
Australia is already rationing fuel. New Zealand is pretending nothing is happening.
Across the Tasman, the situation has moved beyond warnings. Australian fuel wholesalers have begun rationing petrol and diesel supplies to retailers, driven by a combination of panic buying and tightening wholesale supply. Queues have formed at service stations in Perth and Sydney. Petrol prices have jumped from A$1.71 to over A$2.13 per litre.
Professor Allan Fels, former chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, has warned publicly that if the conflict continues beyond six weeks, Australia will need to implement formal fuel rationing - comparing the potential measures to the rationing seen during the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Australia holds 36 days of petrol reserves - more than New Zealand - and its strategic reserves are still non-compliant with International Energy Agency requirements despite years of efforts to close the gap.
The Australian Maritime Union has declared that Australia’s fuel security crisis “has been laid bare” and called for urgent rebuilding of sovereign fuel storage and domestic refining capacity. The Australian Climate Council has warned that the crisis demonstrates the fundamental vulnerability of economies still dependent on imported fossil fuels.
New Zealand has less fuel in reserve than Australia, less domestic refining capacity (none), and sits further from alternative supply sources. Yet the New Zealand government has offered no public assessment of fuel supply risk, no activation of the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity, and no indication that contingency planning is underway.
What Wise Response is calling for:
1. Immediate government transparency on fuel supply status. The government must tell New Zealanders exactly how much physical fuel is currently in tanks onshore, how much is aboard tankers in transit, and how much of our 90-day IEA obligation consists of untested oil tickets held by governments that are themselves under fuel supply stress. It must disclose what the contracted supply pipeline looks like for April and whether any of NZ’s fuel purchase contracts have been affected by the Force Majeure declarations cascading through our supply chain. The public deserves honest information, not silence.
2. Activate the National Fuel Security Plan. The government’s own Fuel Security Plan (November 2025) outlines contingency steps for exactly this scenario, including activation of the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity to lead disruption response. These mechanisms should be activated now, publicly and transparently, not held in reserve until shortages are already upon us.
3. Prepare an equitable rationing framework using Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs). If rationing becomes necessary, and with each day this crisis continues it becomes more likely, the only question is whether it will be fair or chaotic.
Without a rationing framework, the default outcome is price rationing: pump prices spike, panic buying accelerates shortages, and those least able to afford fuel, including rural communities, farmers, freight operators, and lower-income households, are left most exposed. This is already happening in Australia.
Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs) provide a proven, equitable alternative. Every citizen receives an equal basic energy entitlement. Those who use less can sell their surplus. Those who need more, such as farmers and freight operators, can purchase additional units on an open market. The system guarantees a floor for vulnerable households while accommodating the varying energy needs of different sectors.
TEQs are explicitly designed for precisely this situation: a nation confronting immediate fuel scarcity while needing to manage a longer-term structural transition away from imported fossil fuels. The system was subject to extensive UK Government scrutiny and was endorsed by the UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Peak Oil. I first called for investigation of TEQs in my August 2025 submission to the DPMC Long-term Resilience Briefing on behalf of the Wise Response Society. The current crisis makes that call not merely urgent but overdue.
4. Acknowledge the structural reality. This crisis is not an aberration. It is the predictable consequence of a nation with no domestic refining, no meaningful strategic reserve, and near-total dependence on imported hydrocarbons sitting at the end of the world’s longest and most fragile supply chain. The long-term response must include rapid electrification of transport and industry, investment in decentralised domestic renewable energy, and planned reduction in aggregate energy demand. But those measures take years. The rationing framework is needed now.
The window is closing
One week ago, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was an emerging crisis. Today, it is an established fact with Force Majeure declarations cascading through every link in New Zealand’s fuel supply chain. The strait is not reopening. The conflict is not ending quickly. The Asian refineries that supply New Zealand are cutting output and restricting exports. Australia is already rationing.
New Zealand has perhaps two to three weeks of physical fuel in the country. The tankers and purchase contracts that are supposed to replenish those stocks are being disrupted by Force Majeure declarations across the supply chain. The oil tickets that make up the bulk of the 90-day headline figure have never been tested. The time for contingency planning was before this crisis began. The time for transparency is now. The time for rationing preparation is before the queues form, not after.
ENDS
Contact: Nathan Surendran - Chairperson, Wise Response Society Phone: 021 209 6286 | Email: nathan@schema.nz
About Wise Response Society: Wise Response is a New Zealand incorporated society, founded in 2013, that calls on the government to formally assess the key risks to New Zealand’s future and to respond wisely. It brings together academics, engineers, and policy experts focused on the intersection of biophysical limits, climate change, and economic resilience. For prior submissions visit wiseresponse.org.nz and and the Society’s 2 March press release on this crisis is here:
Evidence and Sources Sheet
Supporting documentation for the Wise Response Society press release of 9 March 2026. Intended for journalists, editors, and policymakers to verify claims:
1. Strait of Hormuz - Current Status (as at 9 March 2026)
Vessel transit data
Bloomberg’s daily Hormuz Tracker has reported near-standstill transit for seven consecutive days, with only Iran-linked and US-sanctioned vessels making crossings. On 8 March (Day 7), only one Iran-linked bulk carrier departed the Gulf; no vessels entered.
Bloomberg - “Hormuz Tracker: Iran-Linked Ships Are the Only Ones to Transit” (8 March 2026): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-08/hormuz-tracker-iran-linked-ships-are-the-only-ones-to-transit
Bloomberg - “Hormuz Tracker: Iran-Linked Ships Transit as Others Stay Away” (7 March 2026): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-07/hormuz-tracker-iran-linked-ships-transit-as-others-stay-away
AFP analysis of MarineTraffic data recorded only nine commercial vessels crossing the strait from Monday to Friday.
BSS/AFP - “Only nine commercial ships detected crossing Hormuz Strait since Monday” (7 March 2026): https://www.bssnews.net/international/366540
Windward maritime intelligence reports recorded three crossings on 7 March (one inbound, two outbound) and five on 4 March. Vessel types included one oil/chemicals tanker, one container vessel, and one bulk carrier.
Windward - “March 8, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily”: https://windward.ai/blog/march-8-maritime-intelligence-daily/
Windward - “March 5, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily”: https://windward.ai/blog/march-5-iran-war-maritime-intelligence-daily/
Insurance market collapse
Major P&I insurers cancelled Gulf war-risk coverage from 5 March. Without reinsurance backing from London markets, approximately 90% of the world’s oceangoing tonnage (insured through the International Group of P&I Clubs) cannot operate in the Gulf.
Windward analysis (8 March 2026) - cited above
AIS/GPS interference
GPS and AIS interference intensified sharply, affecting more than 1,650 vessels. Spoofed positions concentrated near Fujairah and the Gulf of Oman, with 44 injected signal zones and 92 denial areas detected.
Windward - “March 8, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily” - cited above
Vessels attempting transit under false identity
Some vessels have transited by broadcasting Chinese ownership and crew composition, or by temporarily identifying as “Muslim Vsl Turkish.”
Fortune - “The best protection for ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz may be claiming to be a ‘Chinese’ or ‘Muslim’ vessel” (7 March 2026): https://fortune.com/2026/03/07/us-navy-protection-ships-strait-of-hormuz-transponder-chinese-muslim-turkish-vessel/
2. Conflict Duration Projections
Trump’s initial timeline
President Trump told the Daily Mail on 2 March: the conflict would be “about a four-week process.”
CNBC - “Iran conflict: Where things stand, global responses - and what comes next” (2 March 2026): https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/02/iran-israel-us-conflict-oil-jumps-trump-netanyahu-what-is-next.html
Analysts warning of extended conflict
Verisk Maplecroft principal analyst Torbjorn Soltvedt warned that countries should “brace for potentially an extended conflict.”
Brookings Institution VP Suzanne Maloney said the situation is “going to be more complicated than the White House may have hoped.”
Oxford Economics projected one to three weeks, maximum two months.
Former UK Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind warned against any ground invasion, comparing it to Iraq.
US war aims have shifted repeatedly during the first week.
Source: CNBC - “The U.S. insists the Iran conflict won’t be a ‘forever war.’ Experts beg to differ” (5 March 2026): https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/05/iran-conflict-duration-middle-east-regional-war-experts.html
Iran’s retaliatory capacity
ACLED data show declining missile attack rates by the third and fourth days. Iran had fired over 500 ballistic/naval missiles and ~2,000 drones by 5 March. Analysts point to depletion and/or strategic rationing for a longer war.
ACLED - “Middle East Special Issue: March 2026”: https://acleddata.com/update/middle-east-special-issue-march-2026
Qatar Force Majeure and production shutdowns
Qatar stopped gas production 2 March, declared Force Majeure on gas contracts 4 March. On 6 March, Qatar’s Energy Minister warned other Gulf producers may follow suit.
Wikipedia - “2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis” (multiple sources cited): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis
Structural damage to energy infrastructure across the region
Iranian strikes have hit refineries and energy facilities in at least six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman. Key facilities damaged or shut down include: Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (the kingdom’s largest domestic refinery); Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility (the world’s largest); fuel storage at Oman’s port of Duqm; Fujairah Oil Terminal (UAE); Mussafah Fuel Terminal in Abu Dhabi; and Kuwait’s Ahmadi and Mina Al Ahmadi refineries. Oil fields in Iraq and Kuwait have cut production because Gulf storage is filling with crude that cannot be shipped. Rystad Energy’s Amir Zaman warned that restarting shut-in oilfields “could take days or weeks or months, depending on the types of fields, age of the field, the type of shut-in.”
NPR - “Middle East conflicts largely avoided energy facilities in the past. Not in this war” (6 March 2026): https://www.npr.org/2026/03/06/nx-s1-5736593/middle-east-iran-energy-lng
Al Jazeera - “Which oil and gas facilities in the Gulf have been attacked?” (4 March 2026): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/which-oil-and-gas-facilities-in-the-gulf-have-been-attacked
Al Jazeera - “Iran war threatens prolonged impact on energy markets as oil prices rise” (8 March 2026): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/iran-war-threatens-prolonged-impact-on-energy-markets-as-oil-prices-rise
The National - “Iran’s new wave of attacks escalates threat to the world’s largest oil and gas hubs” (2 March 2026): https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/03/02/iran-attacks-saudi-oil-qatar-gas/
The Guardian - “Iran threatens retaliatory attacks on oil facilities across Gulf after Israeli strikes”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/08/iran-new-supreme-leader-selected-says-deciding-body
3. Force Majeure
Force Majeure, Supply Chain Disruption, and New Zealand’s Reserve Structure
How New Zealand’s fuel reserves actually work
New Zealand’s 90-day IEA obligation is met through three tiers, each with a different level of real-world reliability:
Tier 1: Physical fuel in tanks onshore. Industry estimates suggest New Zealand typically holds only two to three weeks of commercial fuel stocks in physical storage at any time. MBIE describes actual volumes as “commercially sensitive.”
Tier 2: Fuel in transit (counted toward the Minimum Stockholding Obligation). The MSO, in force since 1 January 2025, requires importers to hold minimum 28 days of petrol, 24 days of jet fuel, and 21 days of diesel within New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone. This figure includes fuel aboard tankers in transit, not just fuel in tanks onshore. The diesel obligation does not increase to 28 days until July 2028. Tankers at sea can be delayed, diverted, or fail to arrive if future cargoes cannot be contracted.
Tier 3: Oil tickets (the bulk of the 90-day headline figure). The remainder of the 90-day IEA obligation is met through government-to-government agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, allowing oil held in those countries to count toward NZ’s reserves. These tickets have never been tested in a crisis. MBIE’s own 2022 consultation paper acknowledged: “There is no formula describing the likelihood of a future event in which New Zealand’s IEA treaty partners would be unwilling or unable to assist in a fuel import emergency.” Newsroom’s 7 March analysis noted: “Paper tickets are a long way from a tanker full of oil. If the strait stays closed and those countries are simultaneously stressed, the tickets are worth less than they appear.”
The Force Majeure cascade described below affects the pipeline of future deliveries, the contracted fuel cargoes that are supposed to replenish Tier 1 and Tier 2 stocks as they are drawn down. The oil tickets are a separate vulnerability, useful only if the ticket-holding countries can and will deliver physical fuel while they are themselves under supply stress.
Sources:
MBIE, Fuel Security in New Zealand: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/building-and-energy/energy-and-natural-resources/energy-generation-and-markets/liquid-fuel-market/fuel-security-in-new-zealand
MBIE, “Consultation paper: Onshore Fuel Stockholding” (January 2022): https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/18594-consultation-paper-onshore-fuel-stockholding
RNZ, “NZ has ‘healthy stock levels’ of fuel, MBIE” (3 March 2026): https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/business/588521/nz-has-healthy-stock-levels-of-fuel-mbie
1News, “New Zealand has ‘healthy stock levels’ of fuel, MBIE” (3 March 2026): https://www.1news.co.nz/2026/03/03/new-zealand-has-healthy-stock-levels-of-fuel-mbie/
Newsroom, “Global oil chokepoint will show just how fragile our fuel security is” (7 March 2026): https://newsroom.co.nz/2026/03/07/global-oil-chokepoint-will-show-just-how-fragile-our-fuel-security-is/
New Zealand Energy Substack, “Strait of Hormuz, An Update” (March 2026):
Confirmed Force Majeure declarations
Force Majeure declarations have cascaded from Gulf producers through to the Asian refiners and petrochemical manufacturers that sit directly upstream of New Zealand. When a supplier declares Force Majeure, it is legally freed from its obligation to deliver contracted volumes.
Gulf producers
QatarEnergy (Qatar, approximately 3-4 March): Force Majeure on LNG deliveries after halting production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG export facility, and downstream products including urea, polymers, methanol, and aluminium at Mesaieed. Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi warned that all remaining Gulf exporters are expected to declare Force Majeure within days if the situation continues, and predicted oil could reach US$150 if the war persists for weeks.
The Peninsula Qatar, “QatarEnergy issues force majeure notice to LNG buyers” (4 March 2026): https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/04/03/2026/qatarenergy-issues-force-majeure-notice-to-lng-buyers
OilPrice.com, “QatarEnergy Declares Force Majeure After Halting LNG Production” (4 March 2026): https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/QatarEnergy-Declares-Force-Majeure-After-Halting-LNG-Production.html
Gulf News, “QatarEnergy Declares Force Majeure After Drone Attack Halts LNG Production” (4 March 2026): https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/qatarenergy-declares-force-majeure-after-lng-production-halt-1.500463379
Al Jazeera, “Gas prices soar as QatarEnergy halts LNG production after Iran attacks” (2 March 2026): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/qatarenergy-worlds-largest-lng-firm-halts-production-after-iran-attacks
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (Kuwait, 7 March): Force Majeure on oil and refinery products, citing Iranian threats, attacks on Kuwait, and the “almost total absence” of available vessels. KPC began cutting crude oil production (approximately 2.6 million bpd in February) and refining throughput.
Reuters via HuffPost, “Kuwait Declares Force Majeure, Cuts Crude Oil Output Due To Middle East Conflict” (7 March 2026): https://www.huffpost.com/entry/kuwait-force-majeure-crude-oil-iran_n_69acb76ee4b05f6f5b97154d
Times of Israel/Reuters, “Kuwait declares force majeure, cuts crude oil output due to Iran war” (7 March 2026): https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/kuwait-declares-force-majeure-cuts-crude-oil-output-due-to-iran-war/
Egypt Oil & Gas, “Kuwait declares force majeure as Strait of Hormuz disruptions persist” (8 March 2026): https://egyptoil-gas.com/news/kuwait-declares-force-majeure-as-strait-of-hormuz-disruptions-persist/
Bloomberg, “UAE and Kuwait Start Oil Output Cuts After Hormuz Blockage” (7 March 2026): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-07/kuwait-cuts-oil-and-refining-output-as-hormuz-transits-slow
Asian supply chain (NZ’s direct suppliers)
Yeochun NCC (South Korea, 4 March): Force Majeure on petrochemical supply because naphtha feedstock is no longer available. South Korea’s largest single-company ethylene production base (2.285 million tonnes/year capacity). 54% of South Korea’s naphtha supply normally transits the Strait of Hormuz.
Seoul Economic Daily, “Yeochun NCC Declares Force Majeure Amid Hormuz Strait Crisis” (6 March 2026): https://en.sedaily.com/finance/2026/03/06/yeochun-ncc-declares-force-majeure-amid-hormuz-strait-crisis
Reuters via TradingView, “S Korea’s YNCC cuts output, declares force majeure on petrochemical supply” (4 March 2026): https://www.tradingview.com/news/reuters.com,2026:newsml_L1N3ZT040:0-s-korea-s-yncc-cuts-output-declares-force-majeure-on-petrochemical-supply/
ICIS, “South Korea’s YNCC declares force majeure amid Mideast crisis” (4 March 2026): https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2026/03/04/11185124/south-korea-s-yncc-declares-force-majeure-amid-mideast-crisis
PCS (Singapore, 5 March): Force Majeure on all customer shipments, citing disrupted maritime transportation and supply chains.
Chemical & Engineering News, “Strait of Hormuz closure hits Asia’s chemical industry” (5 March 2026): https://cen.acs.org/business/petrochemicals/Strait-Hormuz-closure-hits-Asias/104/web/2026/03
Reuters via Energy News/OE Digital, “Singapore’s PCS declares petrochemical force majeure, a letter shows” (5 March 2026): https://energynews.oedigital.com/crude-oil/2026/03/05/singapores-pcs-declares-petrochemical-force-majeure-a-letter-shows
Aster Chemicals and Energy (Singapore, approximately 7 March): Force Majeure on ethylene and propylene supplies. Steam cracker running at approximately 50%.
Hydrocarbon Processing, “Asia refineries, petchem firms cut runs as Middle East conflict disrupts feedstock supplies” (March 2026): https://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2026/03/asia-refineries-petchem-firms-cut-runs-as-middle-east-conflict-disrupts-feedstock-supplies/
Chandra Asri (Indonesia, 3 March): Force Majeure on all contracts, citing raw material disruption from Middle East conflict.
Chemical & Engineering News, cited above
Reuters via Energy News/OE Digital, cited above
Petronet LNG (India, 3 March): Force Majeure notice on Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement. GAIL India reported zero LNG supplies by 4 March.
PU Daily, “Enterprises Declare Force Majeure, The Signs of Impact” (comprehensive tracker): https://www.pudaily.com/Home/NewsDetails/63001
Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals (MRPL) (India, approximately 5 March): Force Majeure on all future gasoline export cargoes. Also shut crude unit and secondary units at its 300,000 bpd refinery due to oil shortage.
Reuters via Hydrocarbon Processing, cited above
Reuters via Energy News/OE Digital, cited above
Production shutdowns (not formally Force Majeure but operationally equivalent)
Iraq: Cut oil production by nearly 1.5 million bpd as storage fills (Reuters via multiple outlets)
UAE/ADNOC: Cutting offshore production, “managing storage requirements” (Bloomberg, 7 March 2026)
Saudi Arabia: Shut biggest refinery, Ras Tanura (Fortune, NPR, multiple outlets)
Zhejiang Petrochemical, China (Aramco-backed): Shut 200,000 bpd crude distillation unit (Reuters)
Fujian Refining, China (Aramco-backed): Shut 80,000 bpd crude unit (Reuters)
Impact on the specific refineries that supply New Zealand
New Zealand imports 100% of its refined fuel, with 48% by value from South Korea and 33% from Singapore. Both countries’ refineries now have companies declaring Force Majeure and/or cutting production.
South Korea: 70% of crude imports come from the Middle East, with over 95% of that volume transiting the Strait of Hormuz. 54% of naphtha supply transits Hormuz. The four major refiners have formed a joint task force. South Korea holds approximately 206 days of strategic petroleum reserves (exceeding IEA minimum), giving it a buffer New Zealand does not have. Yeochun NCC has already declared Force Majeure. Kpler has recommended that South Korean refineries make proactive run-cut decisions due to reduced crude supply and feedstock scheduling challenges.
UPI, “S. Korea braces for oil supply risks after Hormuz closure” (2 March 2026): https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/03/02/oil-middle-east-tensions-strait-of-hormuz/1041772513188/
Singapore: No domestic oil or gas production. One of Asia’s three principal refining centres. Dependency on Middle Eastern oil increased to over 70% in 2025 (up from approximately 50% in 2024) following Exxon’s refinery extension. PCS and Aster Chemicals have both declared Force Majeure. Bunker fuel hubs have cut supply.
Maxthon, “Singapore’s Energy Security Under Siege” (6 March 2026): https://blog.maxthon.com/2026/03/06/singapores-energy-security-under-siege-strait-of-hormuz-closure-fuel-price-escalation-policy-response/
Regional export restrictions and production cuts:
China ordered its largest refineries to halt diesel and petrol exports (5 March). Zhejiang Petrochemical shut 200,000 bpd CDU; Fujian Refining shut 80,000 bpd crude unit.
Thailand suspended crude and petroleum exports (1 March) and introduced even/odd licence plate driving restrictions (7 March).
India instructed state-owned enterprises to withhold clean product exports and invoked emergency powers.
Indonesia: Chandra Asri declared Force Majeure on all contracts.
Vietnam: Binh Son Refining asked government to prioritise domestic crude supply and limit exports through Q3.
Source: Fortune, “Asia faces an energy shock from the Iran war” (5 March 2026): https://fortune.com/2026/03/05/china-japan-korea-thailand-iran-war-oil-gas-price-shock/
Physical vs paper price divergence: Kpler reports that physical crude delivered into China is approaching US$100/barrel, well above paper futures prices. Singapore jet fuel prices have surged approximately 140%. The divergence indicates markets are still pricing a temporary disruption while the physical supply chain is already in structural crisis. Kpler has recommended proactive run-cut decisions for South Korea, India, and Thailand.
Kpler, “Middle East conflict, oil market implications: a continuing assessment” (5 March 2026): https://www.kpler.com/blog/middle-east-conflict---oil-market-implications-a-continuing-assessment
New Zealand-specific downstream impact: Diesel is likely to tighten before petrol because Asian refineries are optimised for the medium sour crudes from the Middle East that are no longer arriving. They cannot simply substitute other crude grades and produce the same product mix. NZ commercial fuel stocks estimated at 2-3 weeks in physical storage. Contracted March cargoes are reportedly still in transit, but April supply is uncertain.
New Zealand Energy Substack, “Strait of Hormuz, An Update” (March 2026):
Comprehensive roundup sources covering multiple Force Majeure declarations:
Hydrocarbon Processing, “Asia refineries, petchem firms cut runs as Middle East conflict disrupts feedstock supplies” (covers YNCC, PCS, Aster, Chandra Asri, MRPL, Binh Son, China export halt): https://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2026/03/asia-refineries-petchem-firms-cut-runs-as-middle-east-conflict-disrupts-feedstock-supplies/
Chemical & Engineering News, “Strait of Hormuz closure hits Asia’s chemical industry” (covers PCS, Chandra Asri, YNCC): https://cen.acs.org/business/petrochemicals/Strait-Hormuz-closure-hits-Asias/104/web/2026/03
PU Daily, “Enterprises Declare Force Majeure, The Signs of Impact” (comprehensive tracker covering all declarations): https://www.pudaily.com/Home/NewsDetails/63001
4. Oil Prices
Current levels
Brent crude closed Friday 7 March at approximately US$93/barrel, up over 20% from pre-conflict levels (~US$77). Intraday high of US$94.64.
Investing.com - Brent Crude Oil Futures: https://www.investing.com/commodities/brent-oil
Oilprice.com - Brent Crude Futures: https://oilprice.com/futures/brent/
Analyst projections
Goldman Sachs warned oil prices could exceed US$100/barrel the following week if no signs of resolution emerge. Allianz projected US$100 in a prolonged conflict scenario and over US$130 in a tail-risk scenario involving attacks on energy infrastructure.
Goldman Sachs warning reported via Investing.com (6 March 2026)
Allianz - “Conflict in the Middle East: Implications for markets” (3 March 2026): https://www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/economic-research/publications/specials/en/2026/march/2026_03_03_IranScenarios.pdf
Physical vs paper market divergence
Physical crude into China approaching US$100/barrel vs paper futures in low-to-mid $80s–$90s. Singapore jet fuel prices up ~140%. This divergence indicates markets are still pricing a temporary disruption while physical supply chains are already in structural crisis.
Kpler - cited above
5. New Zealand Fuel Supply and Prices
NZ fuel price impact
AA principal policy adviser Terry Collins: crude has soared from under US$60 nine weeks ago to nearly US$93. Regular 91 expected to break NZ$3/litre within days.
1News - “’Week after week’ petrol hikes as Iran war sends oil price soaring” (7 March 2026): https://www.1news.co.nz/2026/03/07/week-after-week-petrol-hikes-as-iran-war-sends-oil-price-soaring/
NZ supply chain vulnerability
Z Energy confirmed conflict has pushed up global refined fuel costs, shipping and insurance but said no current supply issues. However, contracted March cargoes are still in transit; April supply uncertain.
1News - cited above
New Zealand Energy Substack - cited above
NZ reserves
28 days petrol, 24 days jet fuel, 21 days diesel (minimum stockholding obligation as at January 2025). Diesel obligation not increasing to 28 days until July 2028. NZ also holds IEA “oil tickets” - paper commitments from the US, UK and Japan - but their value in a simultaneous global crisis is questionable.
MBIE - Fuel Security in New Zealand: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/building-and-energy/energy-and-natural-resources/energy-generation-and-markets/liquid-fuel-market/fuel-security-in-new-zealand
Newsroom - “Global oil chokepoint will show just how fragile our fuel security is” (7 March 2026): https://newsroom.co.nz/2026/03/07/global-oil-chokepoint-will-show-just-how-fragile-our-fuel-security-is/
Additional NZ-specific analysis
Auckland University professor Ismail Golgeci compared disruption to a “smaller but more focused” version of the Covid-19 supply chain crisis. Fertiliser (urea, made from natural gas) supply also at risk. Sulfur - 20% of global supply transits Hormuz - affects copper, cobalt, and semiconductor supply chains.
1News / Q+A - “NZ faces inflation risk as trade bottleneck widens amid Iran conflict” (8 March 2026): https://www.1news.co.nz/2026/03/08/nz-faces-inflation-risk-as-trade-bottleneck-widens-amid-iran-conflict/
6. Australia - Rationing and Fuel Security
Wholesale rationing underway
Fuel wholesalers have begun rationing petrol and diesel supplies across Australian networks. Panic buying has led to queues at service stations in Perth and Sydney. Petrol prices have jumped from A$1.71 to over A$2.13/litre.
News Directory 3 - “Iran Conflict & Fuel Prices: Rationing, Rising Costs & Australia’s Supply” (8 March 2026): https://www.newsdirectory3.com/iran-conflict-fuel-prices-rationing-rising-costs-australias-supply/
Yahoo News Australia - “’Perfect storm’: fuel uncertainty threatens food prices” (8 March 2026): https://au.news.yahoo.com/perfect-storm-fuel-uncertainty-threatens-041844291.html
Former ACCC chair warns of formal rationing
Professor Allan Fels, former ACCC chairman, warned that if the conflict continues beyond six weeks, Australia would need formal fuel rationing comparable to the 1973 Arab oil embargo. “If it’s more than six weeks, the government will have to do something - it may start with some price control and a little bit of informal rationing.”
The Nightly - “Former head of ACCC warns Australia may have to ration petrol if Iran war continues” (7 March 2026): https://thenightly.com.au/business/warning-australia-may-have-to-ration-petrol-if-iran-war-continues-c-21854267
Australian reserves
36 days petrol, 34 days diesel, 32 days jet fuel. Non-compliant with IEA 90-day minimum since 2012. Only two refineries remain (down from 12).
The Conversation - “The Iran war has triggered a fuel price rise. What does this mean for Australian consumers?” (5 March 2026): https://theconversation.com/the-iran-war-has-triggered-a-fuel-price-rise-what-does-this-mean-for-australian-consumers-277605
Maritime Union of Australia
Declared Australia’s fuel security crisis “has been laid bare” and called for rebuilding sovereign fuel storage, domestic refining, and an Australian-flagged strategic shipping capability.
MUA - “Australia’s fuel insecurity exposed by global conflict” (3 March 2026): https://www.mua.org.au/MUA/Content/News_Articles/2026/australia-fuel-insecurity-exposed-by-global-conflict.aspx
7. Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs)
For full background on TEQs, including how the system works, political and academic track record, and applicability to New Zealand, see the Evidence and Sources Sheet accompanying the Wise Response Society press release of 2 March 2026:
Wise Response Substack - “NZ fuel supply directly threatened by Hormuz crisis” (2 March 2026): https://wiseresponse.substack.com/p/nz-fuel-supply-directly-threatened
Key sources:
Fleming Policy Centre - TEQs overview: https://www.flemingpolicycentre.org.uk/teqs/
Alexander & Floyd - “The Political Economy of Deep Decarbonization: Tradable Energy Quotas for Energy Descent Futures” (Energies, 2020): https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/17/4304
Wise Response DPMC Submission (August 2025): http://bit.ly/wr_dpmcrd
8. Previous Wise Response Press Release
Wise Response Society - “New Zealand’s Fuel Supply Under Direct Threat as Strait of Hormuz Crisis Deepens” (2 March 2026): https://wiseresponse.substack.com/p/nz-fuel-supply-directly-threatened
This evidence sheet is intended for journalists and policymakers to verify claims made in the accompanying press release. All sources are publicly accessible unless otherwise noted. For further information or expert comment, contact the Wise Response Society via the details above.
See also: https://substack.com/home/post/p-189923832
Excellent work Nathan. I met with my MP nearly a year ago to outline my concerns about our vulnerability. She told me that the government were reviewing it, or some such. I just emailed her again with some snippets from this article, requesting that they stop tinkering with nonsenselike the English language Bill and start doing their job.